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Abstract
After the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial panic and
uncertainty intensified in Europe. In France, banks faced a widespread confidence crisis
driven by fear that they were exposed to the US subprime market. In response, on October
13, 2008, the French government passed the “loi de finances rectificative pour le
financement de I'économie.” This provided for the establishment of the Société de
Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF), a special purpose vehicle (SPV) jointly owned
by the State and a group of banks and responsible for refinancing major French credit
institutions. The SFEF raised funds on the international market and used the proceeds to
provide collateralized loans to major credit institutions. SFEF debt was guaranteed by the
French government. The SFEF was active from October 2008 to September 2009 and
provided approximately €77 billion in funding to a group of institutions that included the
vast majority of the major French banks. In September 2009, the Caisse de Refinancement
de l’Habitat, a French credit institution specifically focused on housing finance, took over the
SFEF’s outstanding debt management.
Keywords: Société de Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF), State Guarantee

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs
1
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French Liquidity Support through the SFEF
At a Glance
The collapse of Lehman Brothers on
September 15, 2008, sparked an
international financial panic. French banks
experienced significant drops in earnings
and rising defaults. The financial system
was strained by a confidence crisis caused
by fear that French banks were exposed to
the US subprime mortgage market. French
credit institutions stopped lending to one
another. The result was a severe liquidity
freeze and a deep recession.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To ensure the continued financing of
households and businesses and inject liquidity into
the banking system.
Announcement Date

October 12, 2008

Operational Date

October 17, 2008

Date of First Guaranteed
Loan Issuance

November 12, 2008

Issuance Window
Expiration Date

Closed to new issuances
December 31, 2009.
Officially ended October
9, 2009

To inject liquidity into the financial system
€265 billion
and ensure access to financing for French Program Size
households and businesses on October 17, Usage
€77 billion
2008, the French government established Outcomes
No defaults; more than
the Société de Financement de l’Economie
€1 billion in fees
Française (SFEF), a special purpose vehicle Notable Features
Guaranteed debt issued
(SPV) responsible for the refinancing of
by SPV
major credit institutions. The state owned
34% of SFEF’s shares, while major credit institutions owned the remaining 66%. The SFEF
would raise funds by issuing debt instruments on the global market. These securities were
fully backed by the French state for up to €265 billion. The SFEF would use the funds raised
on the market to provide loans for eligible institutions. The loans had a maximum maturity
of five years, as did the securities issued by the SFEF. To participate, credit institutions were
required to commit to a number of ethical and economic requirements, most significantly,
pledging to the financing of the real economy.
By May 2009, the SFEF had raised €49 billion and 13 major credit institutions had benefited
from SFEF funding. The SFEF raised €77 billion in total by the end of its operation. In
September 2009, the Caisse de Refinancement de l’Habitat, a credit institution created by the
French state in 1985 to focus on housing finance, took over the SFEF’s outstanding debt
management.
Summary Evaluation
The SFEF is generally seen as having been successful in both its effort to raise funds from
investors as well as its goal of injecting liquidity into the economy. The State’s guarantee on
debt instruments issued by the SFEF made them a popular investment opportunity.
Furthermore, the credit institutions benefiting from SFEF funding represented the vast
majority of total loans to the economy and experienced a substantial increase in loans.
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French Liquidity Support through the SFEF: France Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

$2,664.5 billion in 2007
$2,930.2 billion in 2008

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

$41,508 in 2007
$45,334 in 2008

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4, 2007:

Sovereign credit
rating (5-year senior
debt)

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Size of banking
system

Source: Bloomberg
$2,672.8 billion in total assets in 2007
$3,118.1 billion in total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
100.4% in 2007
106.4% in 2008

Size of banking
system as a
percentage of GDP
Size of banking
system as a
percentage of
financial system
5-bank concentration
of banking system

Source: Bloomberg
Data not available.
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
74.2% of total banking assets in 2007
73.3% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
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6.0% of total banking assets in 2007
6.0% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database

Government
ownership of banking
system

Data not available.
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
Limits to full coverage:

Existence of deposit
insurance

$100,000 in early December 2008
Source: Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de
Résolution, OECD

684

French Liquidity Support through the SFEF

I.

Fang

Overview

Background
In 2008, the financial crisis originating in the US subprime lending market severely damaged
many European banks. Shortly after Lehman Brothers collapsed in September, European
financial markets were dominated by panic and uncertainty. The French financial system
was under maximum strain and vulnerable to further damage (IMF 2009). French banks,
hurt by a general crisis in confidence and widespread fear that European banks might be
exposed to the US subprime market, saw a significant drop in earnings and rise in defaults.
Restricted liquidity caused mistrust among credit institutions. Banks stopped lending to one
another out of fear that they were exposed to the crisis (Detzer 2014). Sources of financing
became increasingly rare as the flow of funds through the economy ground to a halt.
Unemployment in France rose steeply as did the government’s budget deficit. The nation
experienced a deep recession. Despite all these problems, France was not hit as hard by the
crisis as many other European countries (Conac 2010).
Program Description
Against this backdrop, the “loi de finances rectificative pour le financement de I'économie”
was passed on October 13, 2008, and adopted on October 17, four days later. It established
the Société de Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF) for the refinancing of French
credit institutions, as well as the Société de Prise de Participations de l’Etat (SPPE) for the
recapitalization of French credit institutions. The SFEF took the form of a special purpose
vehicle (SPV) jointly owned by a group of seven banks representing 80% of the balance sheet
of the French banking industry.3 The banks took a 66% ownership stake and the French state
34% ownership. SFEF did not possess a banking license and was thus not subject to such
regulations as the Basel capital requirements, but it was overseen by the French Banking
Commission. Although majority owned by French banks, SFEF had a board of directors
chaired by the French state and over which the government exercised a veto. Additionally,
the bank shareholders of the SFEF could earn a profit only on its invested capital equivalent
to the rate of return on a government bond.
The SFEF raised money by issuing debt instruments on the international market guaranteed
by the French government. The organization was given a state guarantee for up to €265
billion. Securities issued by the SFEF had a maximum maturity of five years, and the state
guarantee only applied to bonds issued before December 31, 2009. The SFEF used the funds
raised on the market to issue collateralized loans to eligible credit institutions for
refinancing. Loans made by the SFEF also had a maximum maturity of five years, with a cap
of 30% of total loans on loans of more than 3 years. The government does not appear to have
established minimum maturity requirements for eligible loans or securities issued by SFEF.

3 BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale, Groupe Caisse d’Epargne, Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel,

Groupe Banque Populaire, and HSBC France.
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The total amount of refinancing a bank could receive could not exceed 5% of its balance sheet
total, or €500 million, whichever value was greater.
To qualify for SFEF funding, a credit institution had to be licensed in France and meet certain
capital requirements. Funds were to be allocated to eligible institutions based on a formula
tied to the size of an institution’s balance sheet in France and the amount of French loans it
had outstanding. Beneficiary credit institutions were required to enter into an agreement
with the French state laying out a number of economic and ethical obligations. These
included providing credit to small and medium-size companies and households, and
following ethical rules on executive compensation and severance arrangements. Credit
institutions borrowing from the SFEF were also required to deposit the funds they owed in
special accounts at the Banque de France pledged to the SFEF several days before payments
were due. This would give the SFEF time to notify the government of a failure to pay in
advance and thus acquire funds from the guarantee. Through this process, the SFEF ensured
its debt holders were repaid in a timely manner.
The SFEF only granted loans collateralized by eligible receivables. Collateral requirements
were strict enough to provide the SFEF with the benefit of over-collateralization. In the event
of a default by the beneficiary credit institution, the SFEF was given “a direct right over any
sums paid with respect to the underlying receivables and the enforcement proceeds of any
security rights attached to those receivables” (de Kergommeaux et al. 2008). The SFEF
charged an interest rate on loans that was set to incorporate the refunding of the SFEF plus
a fee for the state guarantee based on the maturity of the loan and the credit profile of the
borrower.
Outcomes
In October 2008, the SFEF granted a loan of €5 billion to various banks. This loan was
financed by a loan to SFEF from the Caisse des Depots et Consignations, France’s state-owned
financial institution. The state had to cover this first SFEF loan, as efforts to issue bonds were
still underway. The €5 billion was allocated as follows: 25% to Credit Agricole, 15% to BNP
Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Mutuel, and Caisse d'Epargne, 10% to Banques Populaires,
and 5% to RCI Banque.
In November 2008, the SFEF announced its first bond issue at a rate of 3.5% for three years,
maturing in November 2011. Investor interest was strong with orders exceeding €5 billion
within the first hour of operation. By November 12, orders totaled €12 billion. The proceeds
of this issuance were used to provide nine loans for various credit institutions. In December
2008, the SFEF launched another public issuance, this one totaling €6 billion, again using the
proceeds to advance loans to credit institutions. The SFEF continued to operate in this
fashion for the duration of its existence. (Appendix A summarizes its activity up to July 2009.)
The identities of the credit institutions receiving each round of loans have not been released,
though the primary recipients of SFEF funding are known to be Banque Populaires, Caisse
d'Epargne, BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel, PSA Finance, and
RCI Banque.
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In December 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the banking branches of
French car manufacturers also had access to SFEF funding. The banking arms of Renault and
PSA Peugeot Citroën each had access to a maximum of €500 million. In February 2009,the
French government increased the maximum amount of SFEF funding available to the
banking arms of French car manufacturers.
In early 2009, total outstanding loans from beneficiary banks of the SFEF had already grown
by 7.2% in comparison to 2008. This was well over the goal of the refinancing mechanism to
increase outstanding loans by 3-4%. By May 2009, the SFEF had issued bonds worth a total
of €49 billion, consisting of private and public issues. By this time, 13 institutions had
benefited from loans from the SFEF. The impact of the program was broad. with beneficiary
institutions representing 83.5% of total loans to the economy at the time. Also at this time,
the French state requested and was granted a six-month extension of the refinancing plan
from the European Commission.
At the end of its operations, the SFEF had issued a total of about €77 billion in debt
denominated in euros, US dollars, Swiss francs and pounds sterling, with maturities ranging
from 15 months to 5 years. The SFEF attracted a wide variety of investors, receiving funds
from some 900 different sources. SFEF bonds carried triple-A ratings and the SFEF became
one of the most sought-after issuers on the global market (GlobalCapital 2009). In September
2009, the board of directors decided to stop the SFEF’s operations due to the market
improvement, and the Caisse de Refinancement de l’Habitat (CRH), a bank created by the
French state in 1985 to issue bonds for refinancing residential mortgage home loans, took
over the operation’s outstanding-debt management. The CRH was appointed to manage the
SFEF’s debt services and collateral management from January 1, 2010, to December 31,
2014. Ultimately, none of the loans made by SFEF defaulted and it generated more than €1
billion n fees.

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. SFEF was launched alongside a recapitalization program as part of a two-pronged
approach to the crisis.
Following a meeting of Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations on October 10, 2008,
which focused on guiding principles for action during the financial crisis, the French
government pursued a dual approach to aid their banking system that included the SFEF and
Société de Prise de Participation de l’Etat (SPPE). The French government created the SPPE
in October 2008 as a limited liability company to perform recapitalizations. Its first injection
was €1 billion toward the international bailout of Dexia SA, a troubled Belgium-based bank
with operations across Europe, in return for a 5.7% stake in the company. In December 2008,
SPPE began a broad recapitalization scheme for French banks to ensure they continued
lending to the economy.
2. Legal Authority came from the “loi de finances rectificative pour le financement de
I'économie, adopted on October 17, 2008
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The “loi de finances rectificative pour le financement de I’économie” was passed on October
13, 2008, and adopted on October 17, four days later. SFEF itself had actually existed as a
company called Doumer Hyperion since 2003, but was given new guidelines for its future
operations. The use of Doumer Hyperion was a convenience intended to avoid the delay
involved in establishing a new entity.
3. European Commission approval was required for the SFEF.
On October 28, 2008, French authorities notified the European Commission (EC) of the SFEF.
On October 30, 2008 the EC determined that the SFEF was compatible with State aid
requirements. The EC also approved a six-month extension of the program in May 2009. As
discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the SFEF in such a way as to ensure EC
approval significantly influenced the design of certain program features.
4. Up to €265 billion of debt issued by the SFEF could be guaranteed.
Documents establishing the SFEF did not disclose the specific motivation for this figure.
5. The SFEF issued guaranteed debt, using the proceeds to provide loans to credit
institutions in France (including subsidiaries of foreign banks) that met capital
requirements established by French law.
The creation of the SFEF was a unique aspect of the French rescue plan. Most European states
decided to directly guarantee the issuances of their major banks. France chose to consolidate
issuances and refinancing responsibility with the SFEF, creating a much more indirect form
of intervention. Through the SFEF, French authorities were able to exercise control of the
allocation of credit to eligible institutions, based on a formula tied to the size of an
institution’s balance sheet in France and the amount of French loans it had outstanding.
Moreover, with a single entity issuing bonds on the market, France was also able to avoid
coordination problems when timing issuances (de Kergommeaux et al. 2008). If many banks
are attempting to raise funds, their interactions on the market may result in less total funds
being raised. Last, because investors would be buying guaranteed debt issued by an SPV
making collateralized loans to a range of institutions rather than guaranteed debt issued by
a single such institution, SFEF may have enabled banks to access funds at a lower rate than
they would have through a direct guarantee (Cavalier 2010).
The SFEF had initial capital of €50 million and was jointly owned by a group of seven banks
representing 80% of the balance sheet total of the French banking industry. The banks held
a 66% ownership stake and the French state 34%. This ownership structure was driven by
French authorities’ desire to exclude SFEF liabilities from the state’s public debt. A decision
by Eurostat, the body responsible for harmonizing economic statistics across the EU, during
the crisis held that the guaranteed liabilities of special purpose entities established on a
temporary basis to address the crisis could be excluded from public debt if they were
majority privately owned.
Despite this private ownership, the French state bore the risk of the guarantee, and thus had
significant control over the SFEF, which was governed by a board of directors composed of
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10 members. The board included two representatives of the state, one of which acted as
chairman of the board. The members of the board could execute duties only with the
permission of the Minister of the Economy, bringing their actions under direct scrutiny of
the government. Furthermore, board meetings were attended by a state commissioner with
full veto power on decisions that could influence the French state’s interests in relation to its
guarantee. These meetings were also attended by the governor of the Banque de France who
was responsible for the smooth conduct of the SFEF’s affairs. On top of this, the SFEF, while
not a credit institution, was supervised by the French Banking Commission. Thus, in spite of
being a separate vehicle, the SFEF was tightly supervised by the state and its actions closely
monitored (de Kergommeaux et al. 2008).
The bank shareholders of the SFEF could only earn a profit on their invested capital
equivalent to the rate of return on a government bond. This was consistent with the
shareholders’ being compensated for having their capital tied up rather than fully put at risk.
6. The SFEF only granted financing collateralized by eligible receivables and set
conditions to benefit from over-collateralization
This was intended to limit the exposure of the SFEF. Eligible collateral included:
i) First-rate mortgages and real estate loans of equivalent security
ii) Loans made for the financing of a real estate asset in France (in the form of a lease
or guaranteed by some credit institution)
iii) Loans to highly rated corporations
iv) Loans to particular public entities
v) Credit export loans confirmed by particular credit export agencies
Collateral was subject to haircuts ranging from 10% to 40%, depending on the category
of pledged assets.
According to the legislation establishing SFEF, beneficiary credit institutions owed the
SFEF a claim for an amount equal to principal, interest, and ancillary rights of the loan
granted by SFEF to such credit institution; in case of default, a direct right over any sums
paid with respect to the underlying receivables together with the enforcement proceeds
of any security rights attached to such receivables. Loans made by the SFEF were, thus,
highly secure and the SFEF’s exposure very limited (de Kergommeaux 2008).
7. The maximum maturity for debt issued by the SFEF and for the loans that it then
made with the proceeds was five years.
No more than 30% of guaranteed debt could have a maturity of greater than three years.
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The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity requirements for
debt issued by the SFEF or the loans it made with the proceeds.
8. All currencies appear to be eligible.
Program documents do not appear to contain any restrictions on the currencies eligible to
be used under the SFEF.
9. Institutions were capped on refinancing by the greater of 5% of their balance sheet
total or €500 million.
In allocating loans among eligible institutions, French used a formula tied to the size of an
institution’s balance sheet in France and the amount of French loans it had outstanding.
10. SFEF made loans at an interest rate that included a guarantee fee based on the
maturity of the loan and the risk profile of the borrower.
The interest rate charged on loans from the SFEF was intended to cover SFEF’s financing
costs plus an additional fee for the state guarantee. French authorities followed October
2008 guidance from the European Central Bank (ECB) in developing their approach to the
guarantee fee. For loans of greater than one year, the guarantee fee was equal to the bank’s
median value 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread over the period from January 1, 2007,
to August 31, 2008, plus an add-on fee. Banks without CDS spreads would use representative
CDS spreads based on their credit ratings. For loans of one year or less, only the add-on fee
would be charged.
Under the ECB’s guidance, the add-on fee was set at 50 basis points (bps). However, given
the collateralized nature of the loans made by SFEF, the European Commission approved a
lower add-on fee of 20 bps.
These fees were required to be paid up front.
11. Beneficiary credit institutions were required to enter into an agreement with the
French state that set out a number of ethical and economic commitments,
particularly with regard to lending to the real economy.
Guidance issued by the European Commission in October 2008 on the creation of credit
guarantee programs called for the inclusion in such programs of a set of safeguards to
minimize distortions and avoid moral hazard. This guidance did not specify exactly what
safeguards a program should include, but required “an adequate combination” of elements,
including restrictions on advertising based on the guarantee, balance sheet growth, share
buybacks, and executive compensation, some of which France adopted.
The specific commitments required of the institutions accessing funding from the SFEF
included providing credit to individuals, households, small and medium-size companies, and
local authorities. In particular, institutions had to maintain annual growth in loans to the
French economy of 3% to 4% until December 31, 2009. Participating institutions had to
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submit monthly reports on loan volumes and could be excluded from the program for failure
to meet targets. In addition, they agreed to seek ad hoc solutions for customers experiencing
payment difficulties.
Banks also had to commit to following certain rules on executive compensation, severance
arrangements, balance sheet growth, and advertising.
12. Beneficiaries were required to show possession of owed funds several days before
payments were due.
Credit institutions were required to deposit funds owed to the SFEF in special accounts at
the Banque de France pledged to the SFEF several days before payments were actually due.
This requirement ensured that beneficiary credit institutions were prepared to repay
borrowed funds on time or else provide the SFEF with advanced warning of inability to pay.
If an institution was unable to deposit owed funds ahead of time, the SFEF would notify the
government of an inability to pay. This would give the SFEF time to acquire funds from the
state guarantee, and then repay its own debt holders on time. Through this strategy, the SFEF
ensured its debt holders were repaid in a timely manner and thus maintained a positive
reputation for the SFEF as a solid investment opportunity.
13. The guarantee was applied only to bonds issued before December 31, 2009.
The plan was intended to be only a temporary measure. The SFEF was to issue bonds only
until the end of 2009. Like many other design decisions, this measure may have been
intended to ensure the banks were not excessively dependent on state assistance. The goal
was to provide some aid to the institutions until market conditions improved. Also like many
design decisions, this provision may have been possible only due to the subdued nature of
the crisis in France.

III.

Evaluation

The French state’s intervention in the financial crisis is generally considered relatively
successful. Their actions resulted in substantial drops in the credit risk of French banks and
an increase in their debt valuation. The gross impact on bank equity was an increase of 2%
to 7% (Xiao 2009). These estimates, however, describe the impact of the full range of the
French state’s interventions, not just the SFEF’s operations.
The SFEF is generally considered a successful intervention. It managed to raise €77 billion
by the end of its operations and establish a reputation as a fruitful investment opportunity.
The organization received funds from about 900 different sources during the relatively short
span of its operations. The state guarantee played a notable role in the SFEF’s success,
assuring investors that it was a very secure investment (GlobalCapital 2009).
The impact of SFEF funding was broad, providing loans for 13 major credit institutions by
May 2009. These institutions represented 83.5% of total loans to the economy at the time,
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and so were very influential in the financial markets. Additionally, the financing appears to
have served its purpose well. In early 2009, total loans from beneficiary banks of the SFEF
had grown by 7.2% from 2008, well exceeding the target of 3% to 4%. Thus, the actions of
the SFEF were indeed benefiting the banks and effectively contributing to the continued
financing of the French real economy (European Commission 2009). The plan effectively
mitigated the liquidity problem it was designed to address and achieved its goals of aiding
the French economy.
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/_cr09232.pdf.
Implementation Documents
State Aid N251/2009 — French Republic: Extension of the refinancing scheme for financial
institutions (05/12/2009) – Document released by the European Commission giving approval
for
the
extension
of
the
refinancing
scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/231105_1014477_22_1.pdf.
Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 October 2008 at the request of the Banque de
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France on a draft amending finance law for the financing of the economy (10/21/2008) –
Document released by the European Central Bank reviewing France’s plan.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CELEX_52008AB0056_EN_T
XT.pdf.
Moody’s Assigns Aaa To Debt Of SRAEC (SFEF) Guaranteed by French Government
(10/04/2008) – Moody’s decision to award triple-A rating to SFEF loans.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Announcement%20%20Moodys-assigns-Aaa-to-debt-of-SRAEC-SFEF-guaranteed-by-French-government%20%2004Nov08.pdf.
Law n ° 2008-1061 of October 16, 2008 of finance rectificative for the financing of the
economy (10/16/2008) – Law passed in the French legislature establishing the intervention.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Law%20n%20%C2%B0%2
02008- https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/law-n-deg-2008-1061-october-16-2008-financerectificative-financing-economy
Program Summary
Order of 23 October 2008 granting the State guarantee to a debt securities issuance program
carried out by the company refinancing the activities of credit institutions (10/23/2008) Addendum
to
finance
law
providing
for
state
guarantee
of
funds.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/order-23-october-2008-granting-state-guarantee-debtsecurities-issuance-program-carried-out
The French Bank Relief Act – One-page summary of the policy from Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher
&
Flom
LLP
and
Affiliates
Insights
Publication.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/sites_default_files_publicati
ons_publications1660_0.pdf.
Summary of Government Interventions: France (09/08/09) – Mayer Brown LLP publication
detailing
the
French
policy.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/summary-government-interventions-france
Media Stories
SFEF Closes Doors as French Banks Go It Alone (GlobalCapital 2008) – Article on the closure
of
the
SFEF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/SFEF%20closes%20doors%
20as%20French%20banks%20go%20it%20alone%20_%20GlobalCapital.pdf.
RPT-Fitch Affirms SFEF's Guaranteed Bond Issues at ‘AA+’ (06/26/2014) – News article on
the credit rating of SFEF’s bonds.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/rpt-fitch-affirms-sfefs-guaranteed-bond-issues-aa
Press Releases/Announcements
France’s plan for ensuring the financing of the economy and restoring confidence – Minister
of the Economy Christine Lagarde’s statement to the press on the country’s economic plan.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/081013plan_economie_vers
ion_anglaise.pdf.
CRH – Caisse de Refinancement de l’Habitat – Document prepared by CRH for roadshow
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presentation.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/PresentationEn.pdf.
Reports/Assessments
2009 Annual Report of the Banque de France – Document released by the Banque de France
annually detailing its activities and the state of the French economy.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/annual-report-banque-defrance_2009.pdf.
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Appendix

Appendix A: SFEF Activity
SFEF Activity
Date of
Issuance

Amount of
Issuance

Maturation Date

Coupon Rate

Spread

Number of
Loans
Advanced

Nov. 12, 20084

€5 billion

Nov. 24, 2011

3.5%

5 bps over mid-swap
rate

9 loans

Dec. 1, 2008

€6 billion

Dec. 10, 2010

3%

4 bps over mid-swap
rate

10 loans

Dec. 9, 2008

€2 billion

March 18, 2010

EURIBOR
minus 5 bps

N/S

9 loans

Jan. 7, 2009

€5 billion

Jan. 16, 2014

3.25%

15 bps over midswap rate

11 loans

Jan. 23, 2009

$6 billion

Jan. 30, 2012

2.125%

40 bps over the midswap rate

9 loans

Feb. 3, 2009

€6 billion

Feb. 10, 2011

2.25%

9 bps over the midswap rate

11 loans

Feb. 18, 2009

$5.5 billion

Feb. 25, 2011

2%

45 bps over midswap rate

N/A5

March 3, 2009

€6 billion

March 10, 2012

2.373%

15 bps over midswap rate

N/A

March 16, 2009

$4 billion

March 26, 2012

2.375%

50 bps over midswap rate

N/A

March 30, 2009

€5 billion

April 7, 2014

3%

37 bps over midswap rate

N/A

(private
placement)

4

This first loan was intended as a test to make sure the SFEF infrastructure worked.

5

Per Mayer Brown, N/A indicates that any issuances marked N/A did not have loans advanced
(https://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/summary-of-government-interventions-in-financial-markets--france-09-09-2009/).
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April 15, 2009

$3 billion

Oct. 29, 2010

1.5%

30 bps over
interpolated oneyear, two-year USD
mid-swap rate

N/A

April 22, 2009

$7 billion

May 5, 2014

3.375%

37 bps over midswap rate

N/A

May 11, 2009

€5 billion

May 20, 2013

2.125%

10 bps over midswap rate

N/A

June 2, 2009

$6 billion

June 11, 2012

2.25%

25 bps over midswap rate

N/A

June 22, 2009

€5 billion

June 30, 2014

3.125%

25 bps over midswap rate

N/A

July 1, 2009

CHF 2 billion

July 22, 2011

Floating 3month CHF
LIBOR

N/A

N/A

July 8, 2009

€3 billion

July 16, 2012

Floating 3month CHF
LIBOR plus 5
bps

N/A

N/A

July 8, 2009

£750 million

July 16, 2012

Floating 3month CHF
LIBOR plus 5
bps

N/A

N/A

July 8, 2009

$3 billion

July 16, 2012

Floating 3month USD
LIBOR plus 20
bps

N/A

N/A

Source: Mayer Brown: Summary of Government Interventions – France, 2009

Copyright 2015, 2016, 2020 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this
material or to receive permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the
Yale Program for Financial Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

697

